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Abstract 
How does society work? How do groups emerge within society? What are the effects 
of emotions and memory on our everyday actions? George Homans, like us, had a perspective 
on what society is, except that he was a sociologist. Homans theory, which is an exchange 
theory, is based on a few propositions about the fundamental actions of individuals, and how 
values, memory, and expectations affect their behavior. In this paper, our main interest and 
purpose are to find out whether these propositions can satisfy our conception of society and 
generate essential properties of it computationally. To do so, Based on Homans' 
prepositions, we provide the opportunity for each agent to exchange with other agents. That 
is, each agent transacts with familiar agents based on his previous history with them and 
transacts with newly found agents through exploration. One novelty of our work is the 
investigation of implications of the base theory while covering its flaws with minimal 
intervention; flaws which are inevitable in a non-mathematical theory. The importance of 
our work is that we have scrutinized the consequences of an actual sociological theory. At 
the end of our investigation, we propose another proposition to Homans theory, which 
makes the theory more appealing, and we discuss other possible directions for further 
research. 
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Introduction 
 Society and social groups are phenomena that emerge from the interactions and 
communication between individuals (Aureli & Schino, 2019; Sawyer, 2005) who influence 
one another in response to the influence they receive. Most of the time, these interactions 
altogether exhibit different complex behaviors that have never been the goal of individuals 
per se. These emergent properties are much more pervasive than the social sciences, from 
physics to biology, or even management (Aziz-Alaoui & Bertelle, 2009; Cropanzano & 
Mitchell, 2005; Mantica, Stoop, & Stramaglia, 2017). Interestingly, these complex and 
sometimes unpredictable behaviors result from simple interactions between its 
components. Scientists have long marveled over how such interactions lead to complex but 
structured and stable behaviors. Understanding the formation mechanism of the social 
group as an important part of human life (Stadtfeld, Takács, & Vörös, 2020) is one of the main 
concerns of sociologist, that has led to the presentation of various hypotheses in this regard 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Berkman, Glass, Brissette, & Seeman, 2000; Cartwright & Zander, 
1966; George C Homans, 2013; Kadushin, 2002; Turner, 1987). Some of these theories have 
tried to theorize the basic principles of the formation of these social institutions from the 
heart of human interaction via a bottom-up approach. However, one of the concerns of 
sociologists has been that most sociological theories are evolved into a form of theorizing 
without any specific empirical referents (Hedström, 2005). Presenting these seemingly 
consistent theories is like describing how a complex machine works based on its components 
theoretically. We usually do not notice the flaws and shortcomings until we put these 
components together in practice. Today, with the increase of computational power and the 
development of different methods such as ABM (Railsback, 2019), computational social 
science (Anzola, 2019; Edelmann, Wolff, Montagne, & Bail, 2020; Keuschnigg, Lovsjo, & 
Hedstrom, 2018) has opened a window for researchers to study these laws and their 
strengths and weaknesses by building artificial communities inside the computer (Bruch & 
Atwell, 2015; Macy & Willer, 2002), albeit simple and ad hoc. 
In 1961 George Casper Homans, founder of behavioral sociology, wrote the book 
“Social	 Behavior:	 Its	 Elementary	 Forms”	 (George Caspar Homans, 1961) in which he 
developed social exchange theory. His inspiration came from the urge to look at sociology 
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through the eyes of psychology. His main concern in this book is to explain social structures 
based on the actions of individuals, who need not have intended to create these structures 
(Ritzer, 2011). As he speaks in the context of Social Exchange Theory, by action, he means 
the exchange among people in the society. Exchange is a general term. For example, friends 
exchange social approval, a retailer exchanges money and goods, and a professor exchanges 
time and information. To explain these structures, Homans proposes some fundamental 
propositions. These propositions deal with the psychological behaviors of individuals. The 
intricacies of these propositions are briefly outlined in the following (For a more in-depth 
look at Homans’ Propositions see (George Caspar Homans, 1974; Ritzer, 2011). 
Homans explains his propositions by a scenario. Suppose that two men are doing paperwork 
jobs in an office. According to the official rules, each should do his job by himself, or if he 
needs help, he should consult the supervisor. One of the men, whom we shall call Person, is 
not skillful at work and would get it done better and faster if he got help from time to time. 
Despite the rules, he is reluctant to go to the supervisor because the confession of his 
incompetence might hurt his chances for promotion. Instead, he seeks out the other man, 
whom we shall call Other for short, and asks him for help. Other is more experienced at work 
than Person is; he can do his work well and quickly and be left with time to spare. Besides, 
he has reason to suppose that the supervisor will not go out of his way to look for a breach 
of rules. Other gives Person help, and in return, Person gives Other thanks and expressions 
of approval (George Caspar Homans, 1961).	
1.	Success	Proposition “The more often a particular action of a person is rewarded, 
the more likely the person is to perform that action.” In terms of Homans’ Person-Other 
example in an office situation, this proposition means that a person is more likely to ask 
others for advice if he or she has been rewarded in the past with useful advice. 
2. Stimulus	Proposition: ‘The more a new occasion is similar to an occasion which 
an action has been rewarded, the more is the probability of performing that action in the new 
occasion.’ For example, a fisherman who has cast his line into a dark pool and has caught a 
fish becomes more apt to fish in dark pools again. 
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3. Value	 Proposition: “The more valuable the result of an action, the more the 
probability of performing that action.” In the office example, if the rewards each offers to the 
other are considered valuable, the actors are more likely to perform the desired behaviors 
than they are if the rewards are not valuable. 
4. Deprivation‐Satiation	Proposition: ‘The more repetition of a rewarding action, 
the less valuable the further unit of that reward.’ For example, when a student has been 
linked to a professor, they will sacrifice their other activities for the sake of meeting with the 
professor. But, then after several meetings, they may prefer to do what they were doing than 
have an off-schedule meeting.  
5. Aggression‐Approval	Proposition: “If an action receives the reward expected, the 
actor would be pleased. Hence, he is more likely to perform that action”. In the office, when 
Person gets the advice he expects, and Other gets the praise he expects, both are pleased and 
are more likely to get or give advice. Also, the converse is true, i.e., actors would be angry 
when they do not receive the expected reward. 
6. Rationality	 Proposition: ‘In choosing between alternative options, the actor 
chooses the one with maximum utility,’ and by the utility, he means the multiplication of the 
value of performing that action and the probability of getting the result. 
Table 1 gives a summary of Homans’ propositions. 
Index Proposition Summary 
1 Success ↑ 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 ⇒↑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
2 Stimulus ↑ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ⇒↑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
3 Value ↑ 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ⇒↑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
4 Deprivation-Satiation ↑ 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 ⇒↓ 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
5 Aggression-Approval ↑ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑀𝑒𝑡 ⇒↑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
6 Rationality 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑀𝑎𝑥ሺ𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦ሻ 
Table 1. Summary of Homans' Propositions 
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Before going further, it seems propositions 1 and 3 are so much similar, and they are 
just different in words reward and value. From our point of view, for simplicity, we assume 
that value is the quantitative reward. Hence, in our work, we consider them equivalent, 
although they have intricate differences, sociologically speaking. 
Society, in Homans' eyes, is the aggregate of the behavior of individuals. He used 
propositions as the method of investigating society. But from propositions to society, it is a 
long way. Our work here is to produce a society from abstract propositions (the goal is to 
show, instead of telling even via a toy model). To reach this goal, we have to quantify and 
measure some properties that are not easily quantifiable and measurable. For the matter of 
illustration, Homans expressed his propositions in “the more ...” clauses, which are 
relativistic. Even proposition 6, which is an exception to this rule, talks about assigning a 
success probability before taking action. Yet this probability is subjective and independent 
of other parameters he speaks of. As a result, we take a step further by constructing a 
framework and adding some crucial variables. We borrowed the prototype of our framework 
from Pujol et al. (Pujol, Flache, Delgado, & Sanguesa, 2005). Then we tried to broaden this 
framework and implement new parts to have a more compatible tool for simulating Homans’ 
propositions. 
The importance of our work is that we chose a verbal sociological theory as our base, and 
then we translated it to the language of mathematics. The amount of research in this subject 
is not even near enough. Many other non-mathematical sociological theories are waiting to 
be tested. With the power of computation, mathematical modeling, and scientific rigor, we 
hope to arrive at a better understanding of humans in society. 
In the method section, we elaborate on our model and the way we implemented propositions 
into our framework. In the result section, we talk about the characters of the constructed 
society. In the discussion section, we discuss the possible directions for further research. 
Finally, in the conclusion section, we talk about what we have achieved and what is our 
contribution to the research in this area. 
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Method 
How does the model work? 
Let’s enrich Homans’ example of the person in the office. Now imagine Person has 
problems at work, but there are some other coworkers who he can ask for their help. In the 
first few days of work, Person knows nobody. One day he goes to Other and asks him for help, 
and he helps Person. The next day a new problem arises. Person has to choose, either ask 
Other who he knows from yesterday and remembers his response and what behavior is 
appropriate to him or ask from an unknown colleague in hope for more complete and less 
demanding advice.  
This example gives insight into how the model works. So, it is time to generalize the example 
to a wider variety of situations. 
An agent at each given time has to choose whether he wants to transact with his known 
agents (we call them neighbors) or try to explore someone new. When it is his turn, He 
explores with probability equal to 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 and transacts with its 
complement. That is, probability equal to 1 െ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. The exploration 
probability is defined by: 
    𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ൌ  ሺேିଵሻ ି ௡௨௠௕௘௥ ௢௙ ௡௘௜௚௛௕௢௥௦ሺேିଵሻ  1 
N is the total number of agents in the society (N‐1	because	he	excludes	himself). The rationale 
behind this formulation is that when the agent knows a few people in the society, he is more 
eager to meet new people, however, by increasing the number of known people, his 
motivation to explore new people decreases. It is worth mention that this formula is the first 
approximation (first term of a Taylor series of) an unknown complex and more precise 
formula.  
Whenever he decides to explore, he finds an unknown agent and transacts with him. But, if 
he prefers to transact with his neighbors, the question is with which one of them? What are 
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the criteria for	choosing one neighbor among neighbors? The answer, as you may expect, lies 
within Homans’ propositions: The agent finds the maximum utility neighbor (proposition 6). 
And if he decides to explore, who in the society is the perfect match for him? Homans’ 
proposition 2 gives the answer. Although he doesn’t know the result of exploring (i.e., what 
is the outcome of transacting with an unknown agent), he can guess which one would 
probably give a more desirable outcome. He reminds himself of	the situation in which his 
most profitable transaction happened and induces that this situation is the situation that if 
the unknown agent is similar to that, it will result in a profitable transaction. Below there is 
an outline of the core model (Figure 1). 
There are some unanswered questions in this picture. What exactly is a transaction? After 
the proposal of an agent to another, the second agent accepts this proposal unconditionally, 
or he has some conditions that should be satisfied? How can feelings (happiness and anger) 
change one’s opinion about others? What is the effect of memory? How do agents estimate 
subjective probabilities? Etc. The rest of this part is dedicated to clarifying the gray areas. 
Homans’ theory is an exchange theory, so the two people interacting with each other have to 
give something in exchange for taking another. Our concern in this paper is to simulate the	
intra‐society interaction by reducing people’s daily actions to some fundamental 
exchangeable items. As a result, the question that we have to answer is that what two items 
are both general enough to cover a wide variety of circumstances and have social quality 
 
Figure 1. Outline of the Core Model 
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within them, i.e., what two items are general and the essence of their existence is social? To 
answer this question, we have to investigate exchangeable items deeper. There are many 
exchangeable items. Some of them are quantitative (have	materialistic	 form)	 like money, 
objects, area of land, etc., and some are qualitative like social approval, time, help, happiness, 
information, etc. Every two choices are valid and work for us to some extent, for example, 
two people may exchange money for a chair (in a woodcraft shop), or time for information 
(in a lecture), or money for Joy and excitement (in an amusement park). Note that humans 
are complicated, so are their needs. Keeping this note in mind, we claim that money and 
social approval (we call it approval for short) can satisfy our needs. That is, we claim that 
most of the time, exchangeable items in exchange, can be reduced either to money or 
approval. For example, in the exchange of time and information, time translates to money 
and information translates to approval. A reader familiar with basic economics knows that 
opportunity cost relates time with money (Mankiw, 2012b). Information translates to social 
approval because information shows the social status (being a professor relates to high 
approval). 
We make our claim stronger by saying that we confine ourselves to the exchange of money 
and approval. The reason behind this is that the exchange of money with money does not 
represent social activities -it is more of economics than sociology. Approval exchange is also 
not desirable because it only happens in friendship relations. In friendship relations, people 
mutually exchange equal amounts of approval so that in the end, we can assume that 
approval of both sides remains unchanged. 
So, how does the transaction go with two people? Again, Homans’ theory is an exchange 
theory; thus, we assume that an agent either gives money in exchange for approval or gives 
approval in exchange for money. That means we ignore the occasion in which someone earns 
money and approval in a transaction, and the other one loses both of them because this is 
more like a fraud than a transaction. Homans is silent about the details of the transaction, so 
we borrowed the mechanism of two agents transacting from basic economics, and we added 
the propositions to it. 
Approval is not quantitative, so we have to quantify it in the first place. Quantifying approval 
is not easy, and we have to insert a simplifying assumption because otherwise, we can’t go 
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on. Thus, we assume approval behaves like a good, e.g., bread. Actually, approval is not like 
good and behaves differently, but it is the easiest way to quantify social approval. Now that 
both sides of the transaction are quantifiable, it is time to explain what happens during a 
transaction. 
Transaction 
Figure 2 is an outline of what the transaction is. 
An agent has some neighbors, but which one of them is the best shot for him to 
transact with? According to proposition 6, the one with the maximum utility. As Homans 
said, the utility of transaction with a specific agent is the multiplication of the value of 
transaction times the likelihood of acceptance. We know the value of the transaction because 
neighbors are the ones who we have transacted with before. But what about the likelihood 
of acceptance? Anyone may have a different opinion about the likelihood of acceptance of 
the transaction. For example, someone who is an optimist thinks that the other side would 
probably accept the transaction, but a pessimist would vote for a low probability of 
acceptance, although both may want to transact with the same person. So, does this imply 
that there is no actual probability that one thinks the other side of the transaction would 
accept the transaction?	Speaking of epistemology, there isn’t, but speaking of statistics, there 
 
Figure 2. Outline of Transaction 
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is. And that is the probability Other assigns to Person (we explain how to calculate 
probability people assign to each other later on). Let us explain. Person and Other are mutual 
neighbors, so they know each other, and from the last transaction, they both know by what 
probability they have accepted the transaction. Thus, Person uses Other’s probability as the 
likelihood of acceptance, although Person doesn’t know that probability exactly. Let’s see 
this in the Person-Other example. Imagine Person wants to propose the transaction to 
someone, and he is considering Other as a transaction side. So, he has to calculate the utility 
of the transaction with Other. But he doesn’t know by what probability Other would accept, 
so tries to put himself in Other’s shoes and guesses the probability of Other. Although Person 
may not know the probability precisely, he won’t be far off, because if he assigns an 
unreasonable probability, he will learn to be realistic when he faces a succession of failures. 
As a result, he can calculate the utility and propose a transaction to the maximum utility 
person. 
Let’s look at the implication of estimating the likelihood of acceptance by the probability that 
the other side assigns to you in an example. Imagine an agent wants to choose between two 
of his neighbors: a celebrity and a friend. On the one hand, he knows that the transaction 
with a celebrity will improve his approval a lot (value=10, for example), but the celebrity 
would probably reject him (p=0.01). On the other hand, his friend gives him relatively low 
approval (value=1), but he wouldn’t reject him (p=1). Finally, in choosing between the two, 
he chooses his friend because the approval gain from the celebrity times the probability of 
rejection is less than that of his friend.	
  𝑈௙௥௜௘௡ௗ ൌ 1 ൈ 1 ൌ  1 
𝑈௖௘௟௘௕௥௜௧௬ ൌ  10 ൈ 0.01 ൌ  0.1 
⇒ 𝑈௙௥௜௘௡ௗ ൐ 𝑈௖௘௟௘௕௥௜௧௬ 
2 
Let’s assume that the first side of the transaction proposes money and asks for approval, and 
the second side receives the money and gives approval. The first question that comes into 
mind is, how much does the first side propose money? For example, he can buy a custom to 
bring him approval, or he can buy a luxury car to bring him more approval; but what would 
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be enough for him? Here we assume that he proposes a portion (e.g., 1/10)	of his money. He 
does this because first, he doesn’t want to risk all of his money, and second, he only knows 
about his money (and not others’). That means the proposed money has to be relative to his 
money, and he can’t propose a universal number because such a number is non-existing. 
After the proposal of Person, it is Other’s turn to decide to reject or accept the transaction. If 
he rejects, nothing happens, and the Person probably goes to find another one to transact 
with or just does nothing (see	 appendix	 1). And if he accepts, they start transacting. He 
accepts the transaction based on 1. his previously calculated probability from the result of 
the last transaction (this is the probability Person was trying to guess. We will talk more 
about the procedure of calculating this probability in probability section) and 2. some in-
action boundaries that most of them originate from sociological facts (see appendix 2). As 
we aim to simulate Homans’ defined society, let’s keep our intervention minimal here and 
ignore these boundaries for now. Simplicities taken here will enable us to make comparisons 
and improve possible weaknesses in Homans’ model. 
The transaction is a process of bargaining in which both sides try to convince each other 
toward their desired point. We know that the worth of approval for one is different from 
another because approval is somewhat subjective, and people assign a price to it based on 
their social status and their neighbors. This price indicates the proportion of approval Person 
is willing to take in exchange for a unit of money. We call it worth ratio and define it as 
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ൌ ఀ௔௣௣௥௢௩௔௟ఀ௠௢௡௘௬  which the sums are over the agent's neighbors, and it also includes 
himself. The rationale behind this formulation is that the only external source of information 
of agents is their neighbors, and the only internal one is themselves. Thus, for obtaining the 
worth of approval (i.e., the worth ratio), they checkout the overall inventory of approval of 
themselves and their neighbors in comparison with money (see	appendix	3). After all, each 
side of the transaction proposes a different price, and bargaining is to find a price that both 
are happy (if achieving this price is possible). Here we give turn to proposition 5 since it talks 
about happiness and anger (we call feeling). It says if after the transaction each side earns 
more than they expect, they would be happy, and if someone earns less than they expect, 
they would be angry. This happiness or anger changes their attitude toward the next 
transactions, which means it changes the probability of transacting with the other side.  
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Social status is definable in our model. Money and approval are representatives of parts of 
social status. Thus, we define a quantity called asset, which is the combination of money and 
approval as the representation of social status. But the problem is that the dimension of 
money and approval are different. With the help of worth ratio, this problem is solved, and 
we have: 
   𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 ൌ  𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 ൅  𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 ൈ ଵ௪௢௥௧௛ ௥௔௧௜௢ 3 
Their goal in bargaining is to earn at least the expected amount. The case calling win-win 
happens when the expectation of the first side of the transaction (the one who proposes 
money) is less than the expectation of the second side. Let’s see the reason for this 
appellation. 
 Person Other   Person Other 
Money െ𝐴 ൅𝐴  Money െ𝐴 ൅𝐴 
Approval ൅𝐴𝑊ଵ െ𝐴𝑊ଶ  Approval ൅ሺ𝐴𝑊ଵ ൅ 𝑎. 𝑝. ሻ െሺ𝐴𝑊ଵ ൅ 𝑎. 𝑝. ሻ 
 (a)	    (b)	  
Table 2. (a) before bargaining. (b) after bargaining. 
Before bargaining, they expect Table 2.a to happen in which 𝐴 is the proposed amount of 
money (𝐴 is the acronym of amount), and 𝑊ଵ and 𝑊ଶ are worth ratios of Person and Other, 
respectively. According to this, if 𝑊ଵ ൏ 𝑊ଶ, Other is willing to give more than what Person 
wants, so both can be happy because of the bargaining and Other gives less, and Person earns 
more than what they expect. Hence, after bargaining, Table 2.b is what that happens. 
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Which 𝑎. 𝑝. is a quantity called agreement-point. It is the excess approval from the result of 
negotiation (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005) (it is like surplus in economics (Mankiw, 2012a)), 
and it is the point where both sides feel the fairness equally in the same way. Hence, the 
definition of feeling and 𝑎. 𝑝. are inter-related. Figure 3 depicts the agreement-point. 
For determination of 𝑎. 𝑝. and feeling, first, note that 𝐴𝑊ଵ and 𝐴𝑊ଶ have a dimension of 
approval. So, we convert approval amounts to money because approval is subjective and is 
not suitable for determining something that should be equal for both sides. We define feeling 
numerically as the money equivalent of the 𝑎. 𝑝.. By definition, these two feelings are equal. 
The conversion is easy. We only need to divide approval by each one’s worth ratio. 
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔௉௘௥௦௢௡ ൌ  𝑎. 𝑝.𝑊ଵ  
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔ை௧௛௘௥ ൌ  ሺ𝐴𝑊ଶ െ 𝐴𝑊ଵሻ  െ  𝑎. 𝑝.𝑊ଶ  
→ 𝑎. 𝑝.𝑊ଵ ൌ
ሺ𝐴𝑊ଶ െ 𝐴𝑊ଵሻ  െ  𝑎. 𝑝.
𝑊ଶ  
⇒ 𝑎. 𝑝. ൌ  ሺௐమିௐభௐమାௐభሻ 𝐴𝑊ଵ, 
   𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔௉௘௥௦௢௡ ൌ 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔ை௧௛௘௥ ൌ ሺௐమିௐభௐమାௐభሻ 𝐴 4 
 
Figure 3. Depiction of Agreement Point 
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Finally, after the achievement of a compromise, they trade money and approval at the agreed 
price. We define the value of the transaction as the amount each earns, i.e., for Person the 
amount of approval and for Other the amount of money he takes. 
 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒௉௘௥௦௢௡  ൌ  ሺ𝐴𝑊ଵ  ൅  𝑎. 𝑝. ሻ ൈ
1
𝑊ଵ ൌ 𝐴 ൅
𝑎. 𝑝.
𝑊ଵ  
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒ை௧௛௘௥ ൌ  𝐴 
5 
As we want value to be comparable to	other	values, we converted approval to money for 
Person. That is, after the transaction, both sides keep in mind the equivalent money of what 
they earned as value. According to proposition 3, the more of this value, the more they are 
willing to transact with each other again.  
Probability 
Value is used for determining the probability of accepting the transaction. As we saw, 
this probability contributes to calculating utility, and as we will see, it contributes to the 
process of exploration. Every agent assigns a probability to each of his neighbors. Three 
Homans’ propositions determine this probability. According to proposition 3, value takes 
part in determining probability; according to proposition 5, happiness and anger take part; 
and according to proposition 4, the frequency of transaction changes the probability. We 
know about value and feeling, but we haven’t talked about the effect of frequency of 
transacting. Proposition 4 says that frequent transacting, results in satiation, which means 
the agent is less eager to transact again with that specific transaction side if they have 
transacted multiple times in a short period. In the model, this effect acts like: 
   𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ൌ  𝑒𝑥𝑝ሺെ ௡௨௠௕௘௥ ௢௙ ௧௥௔௡௦௔௖௧௜௢௡ ௜௡ ௧௛௘ ௟௔௦௧ ௠ ௧௜௠௘ ௦௧௘௣௦௠ ሻ. 6 
In this formulation, if two agents have never transacted, frequency does not have any effect 
(𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ൌ 1ሻ, and if they have transacted in each time step for the last m units of 
time, frequency effect would be 𝑒ିଵ(ൎ 0.37). Here we fix 𝑚 ൌ 10 for simulation. 
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Effect of value, feeling, and frequency are independent, so finally, agent 𝑖 assigns the 
probability 𝑃௜௝ to neighbor 𝑗 according to: 
   𝑃௜௝ ൌ ௏௔௟௨௘ೕൈி௘௘௟௜௡௚ೕൈி௥௘௤௨௘௡௖௬ ௘௙௙௘௖௧ೕ∑ ሺ௏௔௟௨௘ೖൈி௘௘௟௜௡௚ೖൈி௥௘௤௨௘௡௖௬ ௘௙௙௘௖௧ೖሻೖ  , 𝑘 ∈ ሼ𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑖ሽ.  7 
Note that these three factors contributing to probability are not normalized themselves, but 
the probability is normalized.  
Another action an agent can do and is essential to the growth of links between people in the 
society is to explore. In the following, we explain the process of exploration. 
Exploration 
Let us come back to Person in the office. Imagine now he wants to ask another new colleague 
for help with a problem. He reminds himself of the situation in which the satisfactory 
transaction with Other went on, and tries to find a colleague with similar signs that represent 
the successful situation in the past. For example, if Other was extroverted and affable or had 
an accent, Person looks for these characteristics in people in the office. (Here we only assign 
the situation to the people, not to the external variables like time of day or whether the 
transaction takes place in a crowded or a quiet place). Imagine he manages to find one 
colleague with these characteristics (we call her another person or Another for short). When 
Person makes his request, Another thinks of whether to accept or reject the proposal before 
helping. She may not like to deal with certain types of people because, for example, she had 
terrible experiences from transacting with flattering people, so	she has to make sure that 
Person is not one of them.	After some small talk, Person persuades her that he is not one of 
those types. At the moment, Person has succeeded in his exploration task, and now he starts 
transacting with Another. The only difference between transacting with a new agent and a 
neighbor is that in the first case, he doesn’t have a memory of her. 
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By generalizing this example to a more technical language, we see that one finds a new 
neighbor by first, choosing one of his neighbors as the Model with the probability equal to 
𝑃௜௝ (probability of if he wants to transact with them). For example, if Person has two 
neighbors and the probability of transacting with one of them is 0.7 and with the other is 0.3, 
Person manages to choose one of them as the Model with a probability of 0.7 and 0.3, 
respectively. After selecting the Model, he searches for an agent in the neighbors of his 
neighbors with a similar situation to the Model and proposes a transaction to her. The new 
neighbor then decides to accept or reject the explorer’s proposal by searching in her memory 
and look for the closest neighbor to the explorer’s situation and accept the proposal by the 
probability of transacting with that neighbor (𝑃௝௜) (See	appendix	4). 
Situation is some property everyone is born with and remains constant throughout the 
simulation. It is a number indicating the combination of people’s social characteristics. In the 
simulation, the situation of an agent is a number randomly chosen between 0 and 1.	
Let’s summarize where we have used Homans’ proposition so far. With proposition 2 we find 
a new neighbor; with proposition 3 we connect value to probability; with proposition 4 we 
link frequency of transaction to probability; with proposition 5 we define happiness and how 
it affects the probability; and with proposition 6 we choose one neighbor among neighbors. 
 
Figure 4. Outline of Exploration 
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Results and Discussion 
The main concern of Homans postulates was to demonstrate social structures. By the 
time of his theory, the methodology to study groups was qualitative. Now, after we tried to 
transform the methodology into quantitative, we dare to examine it and let numbers judge 
the predictions. 
We start our simulation with the initial condition of uniformly random distribution of assets 
to have distinguished agents1. Then after a while, when randomness effects turn vague, we 
perform sampling. During all of our simulations, 5000 timesteps were enough to serve the 
equilibrium condition. Moreover, we took the last 1000 steps as the sampling period2. 
After the run of the simulation and having the recorded data, we implement our way to 
interpret them. We initiate interpreting by forming the network graph out of transaction 
data; then, we will talk about its structured communities. To measure how well they are 
divided into communities numerically, we use Networkx algorithms (Hagberg, Swart, & 
Chult, 2008).	At	first, we simulate the standard Homans model with all of his propositions to 
observe whether social structures form. Secondly, we will measure each proposition’s 
importance in making social structures. 
Network graph definition 
It is worth discussing what we define as an edge in our network. As agents’ choices 
are probabilistic, it is a matter of dispute whether any single transaction can be interpreted 
as a sign of mutual friendship. But it can be presumed it is a mutual support friendship if it 
has been repeated many times throughout the time. The repetition must be more than the 
times of which the pair could have done by accident. We call this threshold friendship	point	
 
1 One way of creating the desired distribution for the asset is taking all approval levels the same and putting 
the money distribution at uniformly random one. 
2 The simulation code in Python language is available at https://github.com/mmehrani/homans_project 
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(See	appendix	5	for	its	calculation). In most of the simulated conditions, friendship was inside 
the neighborhood of number 10 and almost with no larger radius than 5. 
Group Formations 
We have defined our network, so we can go straight into measuring its traits. Figure 
5 shows graphically well-disjointed groups resulting from the standard Homans’ theory. To 
investigate which propositions best affect the group formation, we bring out four main 
questions in the following and six main units of measure graph	density, modularity (M. E. J. 
Newman & Girvan, 2004), coverage (Fortunato, 2010), small‐worldness (Mark D. Humphries 
& Gurney, 2008; M. D. Humphries, Gurney, & Prescott, 2006), shortest	 path	 length, and 
average	clustering coefficient	(Kaiser,	2008;	Saramäki,	Kivelä,	Onnela,	Kaski,	&	Kertész,	2007) 
(see	appendix	6	for	definitions). 
Table 3 includes eight different conditions and their outputs. We have compared each graph 
with its random partner which has the same number of nodes and degree distribution. For 
example, the column 1a refers to standard Homans’ model with all his propositions present.  
Figure 5 The illustrated graph of the simulated Homans’ Network. Each Node represents 
each agent in the society and edges between each pair of nodes in the sign of established 
mutual support friendship. As can be seen, the society with Homans’ propositions split into 
three communities. Each node color shows the community it belongs to. 
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The society with column 1a conditions shows the signs of communities' existence. The main 
signs are positive modularity of order 0.228 and 68 percent of better coverage in contrast to 
its random partner. Interestingly enough, one hundred agents (N = 100) mostly desired to 
form four communities. These results approve Homans’ predictions and indicate social 
structures are formed with high indicated precisions. 
To find each of his propositions' importance in group formations, we put each one off the 
scene, turn by turn, to find its absence effect. We ask “what	would	happen	if	they	were	not	
present?”. The following questions are answered by comparing the propositions’ presence 
and absence effects. 
 How effective are emotional factors? 
In Homans’ model, emotional factors are brightly considered when memory and 
feelings come to discussion due to propositions 4 and 5. In contrast, propositions 1 and 3 
talk about how the transaction is valuable and profitable itself. The comparison of cases in 
the first scenario can respond to the first question when case 1a represents the standard 
Homans’ model, and 1b and 1c describe the conditions where not all emotional factors are 
present. 
Compatible to what Homans predicted, the absence of both emotional factors causes less 
group distinction. Modularity lost its value from 0.228 to 0.201. Also, the normalized 
coverage suggests another loss from 1.68 to 1.29, which means their absence causes 
connections to be pruned not outside the groups but mostly inside. Like what (Lawler & 
Thye, 1999) indicated before, dyadic friendships can only happen when emotions are 
present. Here we approve that if transactions between agents happen only due to their value, 
agents will split into smaller groups and lose their cohesion. 
Emotional factors may put a variety of agents in a group to make it larger. Agents that are 
not all notably valuable to each other but who may have left behind decent records or 
feelings
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Table 3: Various conditions and constraints for a network with hundred N=100 agents and their measured results of output 
graphs. marked parameters with (*) are normalized to their random graph partner which has the same degree distribution. (**) 
checks whether agents get biased on their neighbors.
Conditions 
 1 2 3 
propositions N. a c b a b a b c 
Probability P0 1,3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
P1, 4, 5 ✓✓ ✓ㄨ ㄨㄨ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Second agent 6 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ㄨ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Similar situation 2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ㄨ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Acceptances Worth ratio ㄨ ㄨ ㄨ ㄨ ㄨ ✓ ㄨ ✓ 
Close Asset ㄨ ㄨ ㄨ ㄨ ㄨ ㄨ ✓ ✓ 
Results 
Graph density 0.188 0.180 0.146 0.18 0.740 0.188 0.193 0.211 
error 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.02 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 
Modularity 0.228 0.227 0.201 0.27 0.054 0.25 0.245 0.233 
error 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.04 0.002 0.008 0.007 0.008 
Clustering* 1.27 1.27 1.50 2.28 1.005 1.26 1.58 1.35 
error 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.25 0.004 0.04 0.05 0.03 
Coverage* 1.68 1.62 1.29 1.53 3.78 1.80 1.89 1.83 
error 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.06 0.07 
Small Worldness* 1.29 1.29 1.55 2.6 1.179 1.27 1.44 1.30 
error 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.3 0.005 0.04 0.05 0.03 
Shortest path length* 0.989 0.99 0.97 0.88 0.852 0.994 1.101 1.040 
error 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.009 
Asset assortativity 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.02 - 0.06 0.68 0.50 
error 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.009 0.002 0.02 0.02 0.04 
Number of communities 3.73 4.10 5.80 7.17 3.00 4.20 4.00 4.00 
error 0.21 0.32 0.2 0.54 0.15 0.29 0.30 0.30 
Bias Transaction** ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ㄨ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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 How do the past experiences of similar situations change mind in 
upcoming ones? 
In our model, we interpret a similar situation into similar signs and criteria that each 
agent may represent to others. They are independent of their accomplishments and benefits, 
like accent or attitude. These signs are important in agents’ exploring procedures when 
searching for friends of friends as their new options. These may make them optimistic for 
the first contact or pessimistic. If they get optimistic, the transaction procedure begins. But 
when they get pessimistic, they will move on to other friends of friends. When they move on, 
they leave some friendship triangles incomplete.  
So, by this proposition's presence, the network will have much less clustering 1.28 than its 
absence case in 2a with clustering 2.28. On the other side, when it is absent, agents’ explore 
procedure will be ended much sooner with closer distance because agents will be less 
obsessed with new partners' criteria. This can be reflected by the fact that the mean number 
of communities gets larger to the number 7.17 and their sizes much smaller. 
 How central is the agent choice procedure? 
When we take away the choice procedure, social structures fade. Formerly, (Scott, 
2000) talked about choice theorists and Homans discussions of whether social structure 
arises from the individual choice of actions and self-preferences or not. Here we think of our 
model without a rational choice procedure in proposition n. 6 to observe the consequences. 
Without proposition n. 6 in case 2b, indifferent to what one evaluates about all agents in his 
memory, he chooses a partner randomly and ignores his self-preferences. Uncontrollably, he 
may get matched with agents whom he did not prefer previously. Due to this point, the final 
graph will be some subgraph of a random one. This claim is compatible with the clustering 
coefficient ratio (1.005) of the final graph to the random one. 
The absence of rational choice procedure has affected not only small-scale pair interactions 
but also social structures in large-scales. Modularity shows empirically a bright difference 
22 
between standard Homans model in case 1a with 0.228 and current case 2b with 0.054. This 
fact implies that meaningful chains of approval and money that flows in structures (Scott, 
2000), have been missed among massive amounts of edges in the network. 
To illustrate how far type 2b society is from type 1a, we can build transaction versus time 
gauge. Each small green block in Figure 6 is a sign of a single transaction at a certain time. 
So, straight columns on the left hand are representative of mutual friendships, because of 
multiple repetitions. Meanwhile, for the network which proposition n. 6 did not hold, the 
straight columns disappeared and turned into vague random transaction patterns. 
More compatible with the theory, it can be found that these patterns accompany consistent 
intervals in between indicated columns. This is also consistent with proposition n. 4, that an 
agent is less willing to prefer consecutive	transactions. This behavior will cause agents to 
sometimes prefer to look around and do not insist solely on an agent. This can be seen when 
columns start to lose their brightness, other columns get an attempt to light. 
All in all, as we have counted so far empirically and graphically, social structures have no 
means of existence without the self-preference of rational choice, and we should take them 
as a crucial part of Homans’ model body. 
 
Figure 6. Transaction patterns Heat map: (Left hand) The figure illustrates an agent transaction pattern in the last thousands
(ΔT = 1000) steps with the rest of the hundred agents positioned in case 1a type of society which was described in the table.
(Right hand) it illustrates an agent transaction pattern positioned in case 2b. 
23 
 How do additional ad hoc propositions may enhance Homans model? 
Now, as we quantitatively investigated the Homans’ propositions and found how 
some will alter the final result in the case of their absence, one can go one step forward and 
trial extra propositions.  
Having close	assets and the indifferent‐loss rule are not absolute deductions of Homans’ 
words, and we add them from other sociological thoughts of exchanges, which we believe 
will help the puzzle to be complete. Here we ask what will happen if they get on the scene. 
 Close‐asset	
We mentioned in the method that social status can be defined in our model by the asset. We 
use this definition to propose that agents may choose agents with closer social status. If we 
want to interpret this rule in Homans’ propositions language, we can form it in this way: 
“The	closer	the	assets	of	the	transaction	side	of	an	agent,	the	more	they	are	likely	
to	transact.”	
We observed in the result that when this rule is present, it induces the asset distribution to 
have separated classes. Look at	appendix	7	and Figure 7 For further information. Although 
trade between two inhomogeneous asset agents may create some benefit, preserving the 
rule of close assets can guarantee that agents will have enough resources when the time of 
transaction with the same class partner rises. Interestingly, (Sorenson & Waguespack, 2006) 
empirically justified this hypothesis among Hollywood filmmakers when they allocate more 
resources to transactions embedded within existing social relations. So instead of 
distributed value between neighbors of different classes, agents have preserved their values5 
to trade with same class neighbors.	 This fact can also be reflected by “comparison of 
alternatives,” which (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) suggested.  
By this resource preservation, Agents can make themselves more competitive partners to 
win other available alternative agents connected with desired partners. As Table 3 shows, 
 
5. We bear in mind that the value of a transaction is proportional directly to the amount of money transacted. 
24 
more established connections inside groups were detected by the coverage measurement in 
case 3b. 
 
 In‐different	loss	
This again was not the complete deduction of Homans’, but if we generalize the Homans’ 
rationality, words could be: 
“Agents	 also	 consider	 the	 utility	 of	 “no	 deal”	 option,	 when	 evaluating	 the	
maximum	utility	actions”	
It means that if denying the deal serves greater utility than transacting with the neighbor, he 
will not accept the deal. This rule came into the discussion when the agreement point was 
calculated by both side worth ratios. If the agreement stands at a point where the proposed 
agent does not get profit, he will reject the deal and prefer to be left alone by the proposing 
one. 
 
Figure 7. The network case 3c. Nodes radiuses are representative of their assets. The blue 
color stands for the community which is mostly wealthy and green one stands for the poorest. 
Whereas, the pink one is for those who are in the middle class. 
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As the worth ratio is determined by neighbors, agents in each community are more likely to 
have no variant worth ratio (Figure 8). So, we can only expect a meaningful difference to 
happen only for two agents of two different communities. Meanwhile, larger differences 
make more positive (negative) feelings with providing more (less) of a property like 
approval with the same amount of money. So, agents may get more sensitively affected 
transacting with people in different communities. 
Since this time, the indifferent-loss rule is present, it will keep agents safe from negative 
feelings. Because it puts the “no-deal” option on the agents' tables when negative feelings are 
going to be faced. So, in trading with extra-community agents, agents will be affected in 
positive ways more than negative. Since the risk of transacting with extra-community 
members has been decreased, agents will be more likely to this choice (Bottom, Holloway, 
Miller, Mislin, & Whitford, 2006). This will cause extra-community edges to grow more than 
in the case of 3b. Therefore, we will have less coverage in the case of 3c as indicated in the 
table. 
Although the in-different loss rule ceases the group formation in the close‐asset rule 
presence, it will strengthen group formation when solely added to the standard model. It 
helps modularity to grow to the value of 0.25 and better normalized coverage with ratio 1.68. 
It shows when the in-different loss is solely added, it induces well-classified communities.  
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These express the fact the two added rules to the Homans’ propositions help social 
structures formation when solely added. But when they coexist, they work reversely to each 
other and try to generate two different classifications. 
We have answered the four main questions with the help of the computational simulation. 
However, one may come up with questions about the simulation itself like “Are	the	exchanges	
in	the	simulation	portray	commercial	negotiations?” Or “Does	the	simulated	network	graph	
resemble	economic	networks?”	
But these questions have less intersection with our discussion circle, we have not portrayed 
Homans’ rules except for friendship use. So, we may not enlarge our questions circle larger 
than the focused one. It is true that we used money as a common resource. But in contrast to 
(Delli Gatti, Fagiolo, Gallegati, Richiardi, & Russo, 2018), we did not talk about economic facts 
and commercial rules governing the trading world. The users’ money here is just transacted 
with the approval of other people to establish friendship bonds but not commercial ones. 
We pursued Homans’ to check whether adding his propositions will lead us to the dynamics 
which end up in dispensed graph states. The dispensation of the total network will show that 
Homans was right with his social structures and group formations predictions. Comparing 
the main Table 3 columns, helped us to pursue this dynamic. 
 
Figure 8. Width and location of each rectangle express the standard 
deviation and average of worth ratio in the agents' communities related 
to case 3b. 
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Also, one may be right that this is not the exact representation of Homans’ theory in 
computational form. We approve this claim and count our model as one possible 
representation that tried to create a verification experiment to examine Homans’ and social 
exchange theorists’ prediction of group formation by self-regards rules.	
Conclusion 
Our work was aimed to interpret Homans’ sociological theory to algorithmic and 
arithmetic form. We started our journey in the introduction section with what Homans’ said 
briefly. In the method section, we introduced one of the translations following his words. 
Finally, at the result section, we showed how important are each part of the theory with their 
absence consequences, concisely in Table 3. We used algorithms and measurements that 
could spot communities’ structures reformation—the reformations which were 
consequences of conditions and rules transformation. We tried to interpret these 
consequences and find their accordance with some known sociological facts. 
After the evaluation of the main Homans’ model aspects, we went forward and proposed two 
other propositions that could enhance the model to get more compatible with real social 
structures. With the aid of our simulation and the measurements implemented, we testified 
our hypothesis. Arithmetically, we showed the two added ones were successful in dispensing 
the total network nodes into distinguished communities. 
Further research 
In between our research, we wondered what would happen if some changes were 
made, and now, we put it on the scene for interested scientists (Mehrani & Enayat, 2020): 
a) Whether the direction of this dynamic from other initial states ends up in dispensed 
graphs. The states where the graph is not initially empty and have some random 
edges, or the states where the initial distribution of money is not uniformly random. 
b) It seems Homans deducts his fourth proposition from agents' short-term memory of 
recent actions. What if we also add the long-term one? 
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c) The worth ratio was calculated by the agents and their neighbors with no weight 
function. If one calculates it with a weighted function, would it serve a much more 
pleasant representation? 
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Appendices 
Here we take care of some subtleties that occur through the course of transaction and 
exploration processes. Keep in mind that in the simulation at each unit of time, the turn of 
each agent is set randomly and there is no preference for one agent over another. 
1. When someone proposes to an agent, but he rejects, he will look for another 
transaction side until he gets exhausted. In a more technical term, he has an upper bound for 
the number of tries. When that bound reaches, his turn is over, and he has to either wait for 
others to propose to him or wait for the next time step.  
2. In addition to the acceptance of transaction based on previously calculated 
probability (𝑃௜௝), there are some in-action boundaries for the transaction that can be ignored 
except for one, and that is: someone who doesn’t have enough approval, cannot pay the other 
side back, so the transaction is over then.  
The other boundaries are: a) people with much different social status are not likely to meet. 
So they are somewhat, if not unreachable, hard to have access to each other.	We implement 
this condition by assigning a probability of 
   𝑃௦௧௔௧௨௦ ൌ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ሺെ |௉௘௥௦௢௡ᇱ௦ ௔௦௦௘௧ ି ை௧௛௘௥ᇱ௦ ௔௦௦௘௧|௡௢௥௠௔௟௜௭௔௧௜௢௡ ௙௔௖௧௢௥ ሻ  8 
to the transaction (Salazar, 2002). 
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b) (To understand this boundary, first finish reading the transaction section.) One other case 
is what we call the indifferent-loss condition. This is the case in which the worth ratio of the 
first side is bigger than the worth ratio of the second side. As you may remember from the 
bargaining process, we did not investigate this because, in this case, bargaining cannot reach 
a compromise. But Homans’ proposition 5 also works for anger as well as happiness, so we 
have to take care of this case in which at least one side gets angry. Moreover, in real life, 
sometimes the second side makes a mistake and accepts the transaction even though it 
would bring him a loss. So, in the bargaining, he has to give more approval than he expects, 
and in the end, he gets angry because of the loss, but the first side would be indifferent 
because he got what he expected. We allow this case to happen with this probability. This is 
actually the probability of Other making a mistake: 
 𝑃௪௢௥௧௛ ௥௔௧௜௢ ൌ𝑒𝑥𝑝 ሺെ
𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 െ  𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑛′𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ሻ 9 
Which normalization factor is for nondimensionalization. The reason why this probability 
depends on the difference of worth ratio of two people is that people are more alert when 
they confront odd situations. Ignoring this condition means that there is no preference over 
win-win or indifferent-loss cases. 
Finally, as these probabilities are independent of each other, the final probability of 
transaction is  
   𝑃௧௥௔௡௦௔௖௧௜௢௡ ൌ  𝑃௜௝ ൈ 𝑃௦௧௔௧௨௦ ൈ 𝑃௪௢௥௧௛ ௥௔௧௜௢ ൈ 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙 , 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙 ∈ ሼ0: 𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙, 1: ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙ሽ 10 
 
3. A valid question someone may ask is that why 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ൌ ఀ௔௣௣௥௢௩௔௟ఀ௠௢௡௘௬  and not 
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ൌ 𝛴 ௔௣௣௥௢௩௔௟௠௢௡௘௬  or other forms that worth ratio may take? The answer consists of 
two parts: One is that in the first form, the effect of a rich neighbor is more important, which 
this does not happen in the second form. We want this stronger influence of rich people 
because in society, normally rich people have more power and their asset is a more reliable 
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source of information. Two is that the amount of information from the agent's neighbors is 
limited and rough, so they turn to the first form, which requires less explicit information. 
4.a. Agents typically look for neighbors of their neighbors because they are more in 
touch, and that is the case most of the time; but there is also room for randomness since 
people sometimes make friends with strangers. 
b. One case which happens at the beginning of simulation is when the exploring agent knows 
no one in the society and cannot find any Model. So, in this case, there is no preference over 
characteristics, and the agent has to explore for the new neighbor randomly.  
5. Friendship point derivation: consider the case that we had no sign of Homans’ 
rules, and every transaction was performed randomly, and each pair may have transacted 
on average some times. Simply, if we want to spot Homans’ resulting friendships, we 
consider two agents in friendship if they have transacted more than this average. 
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𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡
ൌ  ሺ𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒ሻ ൈ  ሺ𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ሻ 
Effective time: it is somehow different from total steps due to some reason. At first, we do 
not start from the initial step to start sampling. Secondly, not all the agents transact in each 
step, so we want to use the period in which each agent had the chance to transact with 
whom he chose. 
 12 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 
ൌ  ሺ𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑠ሻ  ൈ 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  
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The fraction part in equation 12 will shorten the total period considered, into the period in 
which each agent had transacted in each of its steps, effectively. 
Probability of uniformly random transaction: the uniform distribution dictates the 
probability to be the inverse size of all probable occurrence sets. 
   
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ൌ  ሺ𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠ሻିଵ 
13 
6. Unit of measures definitions: 
 Graph	density	is the fraction of the total present edges in the graph to all possible ones. 
 Coverage	(Fortunato, 2010) will tell us what proportion of total graph edges fall inside 
groups. 
 Modularity (M. Newman, 2010; M. E. J. Newman & Girvan, 2004) is designed to 
measure the strength of the division of a network into communities, varying between 
[-0.5,1]. It is the fraction of the edges that fall within the given groups minus the 
expected fraction if edges were distributed at random. 
 Shortest	path	length	as can be guessed by its word, shows the shortest path between 
each pair of nodes on average. 	
 The	average	 clustering	 coefficient	 (Kaiser, 2008; Saramäki et al., 2007) matters to 
triplets. We observe each node and its directly connected neighbors’ subgraph; We 
compute that subgraph density and set it to the node score; We average the score of 
the total nodes in the average clustering coefficient. It is a great unit of investigation 
of whether friends of friends are also friends.	
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 Small‐worldness	(Mark D. Humphries & Gurney, 2008; M. D. Humphries et al., 2006) 
is a combined concept of average clustering coefficient and shortest path length to 
find how shortly each arbitrary agent in the society can be reached by an agent.	
7. Asset distribution with split classes: We take the average and standard deviation 
of each community's wealth and the total number of agents as the unit of measures. Each 
rectangle with its location at the horizontal axis, and each of its dimensions represents each 
unit. 
It can be seen in Figure 9 that rectangles in a network do not correspond to each other 
perfectly, which is a sign of the absence of the community isomorphism. The fact which 
corresponds with similar real networks that agents distribute into distinct communities of 
different classes which are different in their size and total wealth of lying in the community. 
Although the standard Homans based model described in 1a case in Table 3 results in close 
assets distribution between communities, our enhanced model on case 3c predicts varying 
assets for each class of the community. This is more compatible with real sociological 
thoughts that each social class has its different level of wealth. For example, the upper class 
has the highest amount of wealth among the middle and lower ones (Barry Jones, 2001). 
Figure 9 Communities asset amounts: each figure shows how big and how much asset is lied in each network community. The 
width and location of each rectangle express the standard deviation and average of assets in the agents' communities. (Left hand) 
introduced plot for standard Homans’ model, case 1a. (Right hand) the plot for enhanced Homans’ model, case 3c. 
33 
8. Intervals between simulated and random: Figure 10 will answer the question that 
if we took another value for friendship point, how would the measurements change? The 
answer is that although it would alter the result, it would not diminish the interval between 
the simulated model and its random partner. 
	
  
Figure 10 Simulated model and random partner differences continue to exist while having various values for friendship points. 
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